Sorry, Charlie. This Is Michael Vickers's War - International Imperialism

Sorry, Charlie. This Is Michael Vickers's War
by Ann Scott Tyson via rialator - Washington Post Sunday, Dec 30 2007, 5:26pm
international / imperialism / other press

December 28, 2007

The wide-ranging plan details the targeting of al-Qaeda-affiliated networks around the world and explores how the United States should retaliate in case of another major terrorist attack. The most critical aspect of the plan, Vickers said in a recent interview, involves U.S. Special Operations forces working through foreign partners to uproot and fight terrorist groups.

Vickers's job also spans the modernization of nuclear forces for deterrence and retaliation, and the retooling of conventional forces to combat terrorism -- a portfolio so expansive that he and some Pentagon officials once jokingly referred to his efforts as the "take-over-the-world plan," one official said.

Vickers, a former Green Beret and CIA operative, was the principal strategist for the biggest covert program in CIA history: the paramilitary operation that drove the Soviet army out of Afghanistan in the 1980s. The movie "Charlie Wilson's War," released last weekend, portrays Vickers in that role, in which he directed an insurgent force of 150,000 Afghan fighters and controlled an annual budget of more than $2 billion in current dollars.

Today, as the top Pentagon adviser on counterterrorism strategy, Vickers exudes the same assurance about defeating terrorist groups as he did as a 31-year-old CIA paramilitary officer assigned to Afghanistan, where he convinced superiors that with the right strategy and weapons, the ragtag Afghan insurgents could win. "I am just as confident or more confident we can prevail in the war on terror," Vickers, 54, said in a recent interview, looking cerebral behind thick glasses but with an energy and build reminiscent of the high school quarterback he once was. "Not a lot of people thought we could drive the Soviets out of Afghanistan."

Vickers joined the Pentagon in July to oversee the 54,000-strong Special Operations Command (Socom), based in Tampa, which is growing faster than any other part of the U.S. military. Socom's budget has doubled in recent years, to $6 billion for 2008, and the command is to add 13,000 troops to its ranks by 2011.

Senior Pentagon and military officials regard Vickers as a rarity -- a skilled strategist who is both creative and pragmatic. "He tends to think like a gangster," said Jim Thomas, a former senior defense planner who worked with Vickers. "He can understand trends then change the rules of the game so they are advantageous for your side."

Vickers's outlook was shaped in the CIA and Special Forces, which he joined off the street through a "direct enlistment" program in 1973. In the 10th Special Forces Group, he trained year-round for a guerrilla war against the Soviet Union. One scenario he prepared for: to parachute into enemy territory with a small nuclear weapon strapped to his leg, and then position it to halt the Red Army.

Vickers recalled that the nuclear devices did not seem that small, "particularly when you are in an aircraft with one of them or it is attached to your body." Was it a suicide mission? "I certainly hoped not," Vickers said.

An expert in martial arts, parachuting and weapons, and second in his class at Officer Candidate School, Vickers was also fluent in Czech and Spanish, which made him overqualified when he joined the CIA's paramilitary unit in 1983. Soon after, he received a citation for combat in Grenada.

But Vickers's greatest influence was in the clinically precise way he reassessed the potential of Afghan guerrilla forces and prescribed the right mix of weaponry to attack Soviet weaknesses. This brash plan to create a force of "techno-guerrillas" able to fight year-round called for exponentially more money, which through sheer force of logic Vickers was able to obtain.

Today Vickers's plan to build a global counterterrorist network is no less ambitious. The plan is focused on a list of 20 "high-priority" countries, with Pakistan posing a central preoccupation for Vickers, who said al-Qaeda sanctuaries in the country's western tribal areas are a serious threat to the United States. The list also includes Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, the Philippines, Yemen, Somalia and Iran, and Vickers hints that some European countries could be on it. Beyond that, the plan covers another 29 "priority" countries, as well as "other countries" that Vickers does not name.

"It's not just the Middle East. It's not just the developing world. It's not just nondemocratic countries -- it's a global problem," he said. "Threats can emanate from Denmark, the United Kingdom, you name it."

The plan deploys a variety of elite troops around the world, including about 80 to 90 12-man teams of Army Special Forces soldiers who are skilled in foreign languages and at working with indigenous forces. Today, those forces are heavily concentrated in Iraq and Afghanistan, but as their numbers grow, they will increase their presence in other countries.

"The war on terror is fundamentally an indirect war. . . . It's a war of partners . . . but it also is a bit of the war in the shadows, either because of political sensitivity or the problem of finding terrorists," Vickers said. "That's why the Central Intelligence Agency is so important . . . and our Special Operations forces play a large role."

Vickers is pressing Congress to double "train and equip" funding from levels approved in recent years for the military. The funds, which total $325 million for fiscal 2007, allow the U.S. military and Special Operations forces to pay indigenous fighters and paramilitaries who work with them in gathering intelligence, hunting terrorists, fomenting guerrilla warfare or putting down an insurgency.

The funds are "very important . . . so we can move rather rapidly to train and equip foreign security forces" and more will be needed, Vickers told senators at his confirmation hearing in July. "If you don't have close cooperation, you can't fight the war," he said later.

But while local forces can be far more effective in countering terrorism in their regions, creating the forces must be done carefully, said Thomas, the former defense planner. "The last thing we want to do is create a bunch of right-wing goon squads that go out and shoot jihadists with very little legitimacy."

Vickers is also arguing for billions of dollars in new technology: specialized stealthy aircraft able to fly over countries undetected, unmanned aerial vehicles and other equipment for distant and close-up surveillance, and technology to "tag" and "track" individuals and cars for long distances over time.

Finally, Vickers seeks authority for more flexible and rapid "detailing" that would allow Special Operations forces, in larger numbers, to be seconded to the CIA and allowed to work under agency rules.

"It's striking to see how quickly he moves through large amounts of information" and then gives guidance how to get things done, said Kalev Sepp, deputy assistant secretary of defense for special operations, who works under Vickers. "He knows the key players on Capitol Hill. . . . He understands what level of general officer has to be contacted to make decisions," Sepp said.

But with just over one year left in the Bush administration, Vickers is impatient with bureaucratic infighting within the military and between the Pentagon and other agencies, current and former officials said. One official noted that it took Socom about three years to write the counterterrorism plan, and two years for the administration to approve a classified "execute order" against al-Qaeda.

Vickers, who has advised President Bush on Iraq strategy, is convinced that more U.S. troops are not enough to solve the conflict in Iraq and that working with local forces is the best long-term strategy for both Iraq and Afghanistan.

"Its imperative that the Iraqis provide . . . security, so transitioning to an indirect approach is critical," he said. "The surge has been phenomenally effective . . . but not sufficient," he said, adding that he thinks that without political change the effects of the troop buildup "will dissipate."

Working with proxy forces will also enable the United States to extend and sustain its influence, something it failed to do in Afghanistan, he said. "After this great victory and after a million Afghans died, we basically exited that region and Afghanistan just spun into chaos," he said.

"It's imperative that we not do that again," he said.

© 2007 The Washington Post Company

Q: Good morning, Mr. Vickers. First of all, although it was several months ago, congratulations on the confirmation to the job. There has been shifting and tweaking of the role and office of the assistant secretary of defense for special operations and low intensity conflict. Can you give me an overview of the office today and what its purpose and missions are?

A: Thank you very much.

My responsibilities have been expanded substantially as a result of the reorganization of the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy [OUSDP]. I am the assistant secretary of defense for special operations/low intensity conflict and interdependent capabilities, or ASD [SO/LIC&IC].

As such, I am the senior civilian advisor to the secretary of defense and deputy secretary of defense on the operational employment and future capabilities of special operations forces, strategic forces and conventional forces. While, per Title 10, Section 138, of the U.S. Code, oversight of special operations remains my principal duty, I now have oversight over all of the department’s core warfighting forces. I am also the senior civilian advisor on counterterrorism strategy, irregular warfare and force transformation, and serve as a senior advisor on U.S. policy toward several key countries, including Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon and China. Regional ASDs, of course, have the lead with respect to these countries but SO/LIC&IC provides functional expertise. I also serve as a special advisor on various sensitive activities.

This expanded scope has produced a number of important synergies in terms of oversight of the department’s core operational capabilities, and has significantly increased the office’s overall effectiveness.

Q: Do you see that purpose and those missions remaining as they are or are there still some adjustments that need or should be made? Will or should there be any changes to the structure and organization of the office?

A: Future administrations will determine for themselves whether the expanded influence that has come with this new organization is worth retaining, or, if it is, whether this is the best way to organize ourselves to achieve this objective. There may be alternative ways of achieving similar effects. I would be happy to provide my thoughts to the next administration and the Congress on this at an appropriate time.

I made a few minor organizational adjustments early in my tenure—to consolidate oversight of all special operations activities and resources under one deputy assistant secretary, and to strengthen oversight of conventional capabilities and capabilities integration—but I think we’re now pretty much done with structure and organizational change to the office for the remainder of this administration.

Q: How difficult is it for USSOCOM to be a supporting command in one instant and then a supported command in the next. Where is the decision made as to the lead for a particular event, mission, or operation?

A: You may want to refer that question to Admiral Olson—USSOCOM commander. However, from my point of view, there is clear guidance for the department to follow with respect to USSOCOM’s supported and supporting roles.

The 2004 Unified Command Plan, which President Bush signed in March 2005, designated USSOCOM as the lead combatant command for planning and synchronization of global military operations against terrorist networks. However, actual mission execution in most instances is still conducted by geographic combatant commanders.

More precisely, in accordance with Title 10 USC section 167: a special operations activity or mission shall be conducted under the command of the commander of the unified combatant command in whose geographic area the activity or mission is to be conducted. Only in certain instances, would commander USSOCOM execute a mission; specifically, he will exercise command of a selected special operations mission if directed by the president or the secretary of defense.

USSOCOM, I would add, also has to balance its new warfighting role, whether supported or supporting, with its traditional force provider role, but I think they do both superbly.

Q: What role does your office have in developing the plan for a Special Operations Command Africa?

A: Senior officials from the office of the undersecretary of defense for policy have played major roles in standing up AFRICOM. Our deputy assistant secretary of defense for African affairs, Theresa Whelan, has been our point person, and, I would add, has done a magnificent job. The principal deputy undersecretary of defense for policy, Ryan Henry, has also been heavily engaged in the AFRICOM project.

SO/LIC&IC serves in an oversight capacity in the development of Special Operations Command Africa. Special Operations Command Europe is leading the department’s effort in this area, and is doing great work. SOC AFRICOM will make major contributions to advance U.S. interests.

Q: Although the budget issues are being worked as we speak, can you give us some insight into the key factors that are driving the USSOCOM budget? RDT&E funding is down about 40 percent from the $593 million in FY06. Procurement has remained a little steadier, only down about 4 percent from FY06.

A: Key factors driving USSOCOM’s FY 2008 budget are the historically unmatched growth in USSOCOM and the associated costs to recruit, train and equip this larger force. We are increasing personnel by approximately 6,000 in FY 2008; adding manpower to Special Forces groups, the Ranger Regiment, SEAL units, a Predator squadron, civil affairs units, psychological operations units, and the special operations aviation regiment. This larger force requires more dollars in the USSOCOM budget to expand the infrastructure needed to recruit, train, equip and house the additional servicemembers.

In order to be consistent in our budget comparisons, we decided to use our 2006 and 2008 president’s budget [PB] submissions as our baseline. Using the PB as a baseline:

The 40 percent decrease in RDT&E is reflective of a comparison between previous years’ appropriated funds and the current year budgeted amount. Previous year appropriated funds takes into account over $150 million per fiscal year in Congressional earmarks and programs that have shifted from the R&D phase to the procurement phase. If you compare PB to PB the RDT&E account has decreased by approximately 22 percent from $484 million in FY 2006 to $374 million in FY2008. This decrease reflects programs such as the CV-22 and the advanced tactical laser advanced concept technology demonstration completing one phase of the acquisition process and transitioning to the next.

USSOCOM procurement has actually increased by approximately 32 percent, from $1.2 billion in the FY 2006 PB to $1.8 billion in the FY 2008 PB. The primary drivers of this increase are CV-22B modifications, the MC-130H Combat Talon II wing boxes, SOF tanker modifications, non-standard aviation to support theater special operations commands, and other C-130 modifications.

Operations and maintenance has increased by approximately 32 percent from $2.2 billion in the FY 2006 PB to approximately $3.3 billion in the FY 2008 PB. This increase supports the continued expansion of the force to meet the demands of countering global terrorism. Activities in various forms of combat, intelligence and communication operational support have increased.

Military construction has increased by approximately 74 percent from $174.5 million the FY 2006 PB to $675.7 million in the FY2008 PB. These dollars add academic instruction facilities, operations facilities, billets, equipment facilities, aircraft parking ramps and other necessary facilities.

Q: What are your program oversight responsibilities for advanced technology development programs?

A: We oversee a number of advanced technology programs. Among these programs are the Combating Terrorism Technology Support Office [CTTSO], SO/LIC&IC advanced development, and humanitarian demining R&D initiatives. We have oversight, executive direction, and responsibility for DoD sponsorship for the Technical Support Working Group [TSWG], which is part of the CTTSO.

The TSWG is a stand-alone interservice, interagency and international working group that conducts national R&D programs for combating terrorism. TSWG is a user-driven organization tasked with rapidly developing the newest technologies for warfighters and first-responders to combat terrorist activities. TSWG operates across the four pillars of combating terrorism: antiterrorism, counterterrorism, intelligence and consequence management. TSWG has been developing these capabilities for two decades.

Our oversight ensures that these programs continue to focus on the quick development of solutions to rapidly evolving requirements of GWOT that might otherwise go unmet. Leveraging our traditional strong relationships, we can take operational requirements directly from warfighters, incorporate policy objectives of the Department of Defense, and enable technical experts to develop and provide capabilities that are rapidly fielded and pertinent to our special operations and conventional forces.

Our advanced development programs develop and demonstrate prototype technologies in an operational environment in order to assess and validate technological maturity and military utility. Our explosive ordnance disposal/low-intensity conflict project provides advanced technology and equipment solutions for military EOD operators and special operations forces to meet the challenges of improvised explosive devices.

We also have the irregular warfare support [IWS] project. The IWS project leverages ongoing research efforts of USSOCOM, the military departments, defense agencies, and other federal agencies to analyze, modify, design, and demonstrate enduring counterinsurgency and counterterrorism technical and operational capabilities.

We also execute cooperative R&D initiatives focusing on combating terrorism with many partner nations. We have long-standing agreements with the United Kingdom, Israel and Canada. In 2006 we also added agreements with Australia and Singapore. These international partnerships allow the U.S. to leverage foreign experience, expertise and resources in the global fight against terrorists and their infrastructure.

The oversight SO/LIC&IC provides to these important DoD, interagency, and international efforts ensures that our forces get the advanced technology and capabilities they need to fight the GWOT.

Q: Much has been made of ensuring that special operations keeps a balance between their capability to conduct kinetic operations and the desire to carry-out operations without the use of lethal force if possible. What are some of the factors that your office considers in this equation?

A: The principal balance that needs to be achieved is not so much between kinetic and non-kinetic as it is between direct and indirect approaches—i.e., what we do ourselves and what we do by, with and through others. USSOCOM’s indirect capabilities will be increasingly central to the global war on terrorism.

While resources devoted to USSOCOM’s indirect capabilities have increased substantially since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, we need to ensure that this part of the portfolio is fully resourced, at both the service and USSOCOM levels, and that a proper balance is achieved between these two complementary approaches.

Resourcing our direct and indirect capabilities should not be allowed to become a zero-sum game, however—resources should not simply be shifted from the direct side to the indirect. USSOCOM’s direct capabilities are absolutely vital and must remain fully resourced. Our direct forces engage in indirect operations, and our indirect forces engage in direct operations, so it’s a more complicated picture than often portrayed.

Q: Would some of these issues be addressed if all civil affairs and PSYOP units were still under the direct control of a special operations command?

A: Civil affairs and psychological operations units are key enablers for the total force, not just special operations. The DoD civil affairs force now consists of elements from the U.S. Army, Navy and Marine Corps, and support both special and conventional operations.

Likewise, psychological operations forces support both general purpose forces [GPF] and SOF. As the GPF take on a larger role in irregular warfare, the department will likely require additional CA/PSYOP capacity to support both SOF and GPF. The joint staff is conducting an analysis of CA/PSYOP requirements within a study on irregular warfare in time for the next program objective memorandum.

We will review the results of this study and work with the joint staff, the services and the combatant commands to determine the shortfalls and how best to address them.

Q: What do you see as the biggest challenges your office and special operations face in the next 12 months?

A: The overarching challenge will be to implement the direction provided in the 2006 QDR while providing policy oversight over ongoing operations. The key challenges I will face during the remainder of my tenure will be to: Ensure that we set the conditions to prevail in the global war on terror; Develop the strategy and organization, secure the necessary authorities, and achieve the interagency integration required to facilitate the effective future global employment of SOF, particularly in countries with which the U.S. is not at war; and ensure that we secure the necessary resources to transform our warfighting capabilities—special operations, strategic, and conventional—in time to minimize future strategic risk to our nation.

Q: Is there anything else you would like to add?

A: Thank you for the opportunity to share my views with your readers.

© 2007 Kerrigan Media International.

Michael G. Vickers was confirmed by the U.S. Senate as the assistant secretary of defense (special operations/low-intensity conflict & interdependent capabilities) on July 23, 2007. He is the senior civilian advisor to the secretary and deputy secretary of defense on the capabilities and operational employment of special operations forces, strategic forces and conventional forces. He is also the senior civilian advisor on counterterrorism strategy, irregular warfare and force transformation.

Prior to his appointment as ASD SO/LIC&IC, Vickers served as senior vice president, strategic studies, at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. In this capacity, he provided advice on Iraq strategy to President Bush and his war cabinet. He also was a senior advisor to the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, and executive director of the QDR Red Team, which provided an assessment of the QDR for the deputy secretary and vice chairman. In late 2005, Vickers conducted an independent assessment of special operations forces (the Downing Report) for the secretary of defense. He is the author of numerous publications, among which is The Revolution in War.

From 1973 to 1986, Vickers served as an Army Special Forces non-commissioned officer, Special Forces officer, and CIA operations officer. During this period, he had operational and combat experience in Central America and the Caribbean, the Middle East, and Central and South Asia. His operational experience spans covert action and espionage, unconventional warfare, counterterrorism (including hostage rescue operations), counterinsurgency and foreign internal defense.

During the mid-1980s, Vickers was the principal strategist for the largest covert action program in the CIA’s history: the paramilitary operation that drove the Soviet army out of Afghanistan. He oversaw a major change in U.S. strategy, provided strategic and operational direction to an insurgent force of more than 300 unit commanders, 150,000 full-time fighters, and 500,000 part-time fighters, coordinated the efforts of more than 10 foreign governments, and controlled an annual budget in excess of $2 billion in current dollars.

Vickers received his B.A., with honors, from the University of Alabama. He also holds an M.B.A. from the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania.

Every time you doodle dandies open your blustering mouths you blow it -- regardless of your intentions.

Thanks for supplying the missing piece to a puzzle we've been working on -- we now have a pattern, picture perfect!

We also have a slice of apple pie for you to choke on, Mike -- give it your best shot.

You dumb seppo fucks. You blow it before you start. Learn something from the Russians and Chinese; KEEP YOUR STUPID MOUTHS SHUT!

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